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Abstract— The steadily increasing air traffic in particular on 
transoceanic routes requires extending controlled airspace to 
those regions not yet covered by ground based surveillance. In 
this paper the authors present the world's first in-orbit demon-
stration of a space based ADS-B system, hosted on the ESA 
satellite PROBA-V. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Air traffic surveillance as applied in controlled airspace is 
nowadays mostly based on radar ground stations using Primary 
Surveillance Radar (PSR), Secondary Surveillance Radar 
(SSR) or Mode-S radars. Air traffic regions with high traffic 
density and en-route separation minima of 5 NM require 
seamless and continuous surveillance, which is ensured by a 
complex infrastructure of radar stations, radar networks and 
surveillance data processing systems. This surveillance 
infrastructure as implemented in structurally well-developed 
continental areas like Europe, the U.S. or certain regions in 
Asia, provides comprehensive situation awareness to the 
controllers in the air traffic control centers as required for a 
safe and efficient air traffic management.  
For several years a further surveillance technology has been 
developed and introduced in certain flight regions: ADS-B 
(Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast) as 
implemented in modern Mode-S transponders on board of 
aircraft transmits periodically the flight position and other 
information by Extended Squitter messages (1090ES) on the 
1090 MHz SSR-Mode-S downlink frequency (ADS-B Out). 
As ADS-B receiving ground stations are less complex and 
costly than radar stations, they will complement or even 
replace radar stations in the future, being integrated in the 
existing surveillance infrastructure.  
The European ADS-B Implementing Rule mandates that 
new aircraft heavier than 5700 kg or faster than 250 knots will 
be equipped with ADS-B-Out from 2015 on, and for existing 
aircraft a retrofit from end of 2017 on. In 2020 ADS-B 
surveillance shall become operational. Similar mandates exist 
for some Asian regions and the U.S., whilst in Australia ADS-
B-Out was required from end of 2012 on.  
On the other hand most regions of the world are 
uncontrolled airspace, since in oceanic, polar or mountainous 
regions or underdeveloped continental areas the installation of 
ground based surveillance systems is either technically or 
economically impossible. In these so-called Non-Radar 
Airspaces (NRA) surveillance is applied procedurally, which 
means that the pilot issues position reports via aircraft radio 
when certain waypoints have been reached. Modern aircraft are 
also equipped with ADS-C (Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
– Contract), a point-to-point data link connection based on 
FANS1/A equipment and Satcom or HFDL data link. Due to 
limited bandwidth and service costs the system transmits the 
flight position and other information only every 15 minutes. In 
both cases no seamless and continuous flight surveillance is 
possible, with the consequence of separation distances of 50 – 
80 NM due to safety reasons. 
In the case of a flight accident the situation may be more 
problematic, when search and rescue measures have to be 
performed without knowledge of the crash site position. After 
the accident of the AF447 flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in 
the south Atlantic it took five days to locate the crash site, and 
two more years to recover the black box.  
In order to avoid misunderstandings it must be stated 
clearly and with regard to a recent fatal accident, that localizing 
an aircraft by ADS-B will function only as long as the 
transponder is working. A transponder failure or a manual 
deactivation due to an electrical problem will prevent Air 
Traffic Control from locating an aircraft in distress.  
In 2008 the German Aerospace Center (DLR) started to 
investigate whether 1090ES ADS-B signals broadcasted by 
aircraft can be received on board of low earth orbiting (LEO) 
satellites [1]. The studies and simulations lead to the DLR 
project “ADS-B over Satellite” (AOS), which served for the 
development of a space-qualified ADS-B receiver and antenna 
system. The In-Orbit Demonstration (IOD) aimed at 
demonstrating the feasibility of worldwide satellite based 
ADS-B surveillance [2].  
AOS is conducted in the frame of ESA’s PROBA-V 
mission (PROBA Vegetation [3]) and was successfully 
launched on top of Europe’s newest launcher VEGA on 7th of 
May 2013 at 04:06:31 CEST from the European spaceport 
Centre Spatial Guyanese (CSG) in French Guyana.  
The IOD is capable to receive, decode and forward all 
Mode S downlink telegram formats. This includes the DF17 
Extended Squitter comprising ADS-B information and DF11 
Short Squitter.  
ADS-B over Satellite is the first experiment of its kind and 
a first step for demonstration and verification of space based air 
traffic surveillance.  
II. RECEIVER TECHNOLOGY  
Detection and demodulation of weak Mode S signals of 
Mode S-based ADS-B messages at distances of several 
hundred kilometers is not comparable to any other ADS-B 
application on ground or within airspace. According to the 
restrictive link budget there is only a small margin for a 
Mode S correlation and demodulation process to function 
properly. One must be aware that the hosted payload in LEO is 
seeking for very weak Mode S signals. Transponder signals 
have not been developed for received levels below -90 dBm in 
general and have poor correlation properties. Originally, Mode 
S telegram formats were designed to mitigate some severe SSR 
problems as Garbling and FRUIT. A conventional Mode S 
preamble correlation of baseband pulses does normally not 
bring up sufficient process gain for a successful detection of 
very weak signals. 
The developed receiver makes use of the phase coherence 
between single telegram pulses [4]. In modern airliner 
transponders, the generated RF pulses origin from a single 
clock source and the signal is then amplified to match the 
required output level. Typically, the carrier frequency deviation 
from 1090 MHz is below 100 kHz so the received phase is a 
useful quantity to enhance the correlation process.  
 
Fig. 1: Receiver calibration with different levels and  
frequency deviations from 1090MHz  
In Fig. 1 the receiver calibration results are shown using 
various test levels and frequency deviations from the nominal 
value 1090 MHz. As the receiver indicates an 8 Bit amplitude 
value for each received Mode S telegram, this allows tracing it 
back to the absolute signal level in dBm at the receiver's input. 
It can be seen that the receiver is decoding telegrams well 
below -100 dBm which is sufficient for catching weak 
transponder signals. Using a 10 kHz step in calibration for 
frequencies within +/-100 kHz deviation around 1090 MHz, 
the curves show no significant variance. Therefore, an 
additional frequency dependency can be neglected. 
A special feature is included in the receiver that allows to 
record and downlink the raw 16 bit intermediate frequency (IF) 
samples at full telegram length for a limited number of Mode S 
telegrams. This allows improving receivers and correlation 
algorithms in a lab having the original signal source from space 
in a box. This innovative technique will be tested and improved 
during mission runtime since the receiver FPGA configuration 
and the firmware of its embedded processor can be changed 
from remote. 
 
Fig. 2: SSR band pass raw data from IF  
 
Fig. 3: SSR IF spectrum  
In Fig. 2 an example of a DF11 Mode S Short Squitter at a 
level of a -95 dBm is given with plotted IF samples (band pass 
signal) and video pulses (baseband). Applying a transformation 
in the frequency domain, a spectrum as shown in Fig. 3 can be 
generated.  
III. RESULTS 
A. General Aspects 
The evaluation of the results achieved should take into 
account, that the IOD is the first of its kind, and no comparable 
experiences have been made so far or evaluation results exist 
worldwide. Only a single satellite is equipped with a space-
qualified ADS-B receiver, and due to limitations in costs and 
time but in particular resources available on PROBA-V 
concerning electrical power, equipment mass and geometry a 
relatively simple antenna and receiver design was 
implemented. 
The reception of 1090 Extended Squitter ADS-B messages 
on board of the PROBA-V satellite is mainly affected by the 
following issues, which can lead to a loss of ADS-B 
information:  
• RF signal loss due to the long distance between the 
receiving satellite at an altitude of approximately 820 
km and the transmitting aircraft at an altitude of 0 to 12 
km. In comparison the range for ground based ADS-B 
amounts to 150 NM.  
• RF signal loss due to the shape of the vertical antenna 
pattern of the satellite and the aircraft antennas. 
• Garbling, which means that messages arriving at the 
ADS-B antenna at the same time overlap and thus may 
not be decoded by the ADS-B receiver.  
• The speed of the PROBA-V LEO satellite of about 
27000 km/h, which leads to a time of observation for 
each detected aircraft limited to about 3 minutes 
maximum.  
Additionally it must be considered, that the ADS-B 
receiver on board of PROBA-V is a hosted payload, whilst the 
main mission is the vegetation scanner. So the antenna 
mounting position was a compromise in order not to disturb the 
main mission and the other payloads.  
B. Link Budget 
As indicated in Section II, Mode S Transponder signals 
have not been developed for levels below -90 dBm in general 
and have poor correlation properties.  
Fig. 4 shows the achieved correlation quality of the space 
based ADS-B receiver for the satellite pass 4119, recorded on 
the 6th of June 2014. Obviously, the better the signal power 
and neglecting the frequency deviation, the better the 
performance of the correlation algorithm is. The highest value 
measured in pass 4119 has its maximum ADC value around 
110 and a minimum between 40 and 50. These values can be 
transformed to signal power values of roughly -90 dBm as a 
maximum and -102 to -104 dBm as a minimum.  
 
Fig. 4: Correlation Quality in pass 4119 
Summarizing the power values over a period of one month 
as shown in Fig. 5 the dynamic bandwidth of the receiver is 
clearly visible with an absolute upper value of -90 dBm and an 
absolute minimum of -104 dBm measured at the receivers 
LNA. Thus, the actual correlation method yields to a receiver 
sensitivity of -104 dBm.  
 
Fig. 5: Correlation quality in February 2014  
During the development phase, when the orbital parameters 
of PROBA-V had not been disclosed yet, the calculation of the 
link budget was based on the following assumptions:  
• Orbit Altitude = 780 km  
• Inclination = 98 °  
• Minimum Reception Distance = 780 km  
• Maximum Reception Distance = 2742 km  
The calculated power values of maximal -89 dBm 
and -103 dBm minimal were fully confirmed by the in-orbit 
measurements with ADS-B over satellite. 
C. Received and decoded Aircraft Positions  
In the following some examples of received and decoded 
aircraft tracks and position plots will be presented.  
Fig. 6 shows several orbits of PROBA-V during pass 2699 
on 11th February 2014 together with the recorded aircraft 
tracks. A pass starts after PROBA-V gets in the range of the of 
the satellite operation center Redu in Belgium, where data 
stored onboard is downlinked in a burst. The pass will end after 
several orbits when the satellite again gets near the ground 
station.  
 
Fig. 6: Aircraft Tracks observed by PROBA-V 
The red dots represent track segments of aircraft detected 
by the satellite when its orbit passes them. With a size of the 
antenna footprint of approximately 1200 km along track and 
500 km lateral, PROBA-V scans the global airspace strip by 
strip.  
 
Fig. 7: Trajectory of a flight from Rome to London observed over France 
Fig. 7 gives a more detailed view on a single trajectory. The 
example shows an aircraft flying over France from Rome to 
London. The blue line is the aircraft track with dots for every 
aircraft position. It shows several gaps, where no position 
messages were received. The red line is the ascending satellite 
flight path, and the red dots show the satellite positions 
corresponding to the received position messages. As can be 
seen the observation period for an aircraft is short in 
comparison to the length of the satellite’s orbital segment.  
Fig. 8 shows the same trajectory inside the footprint. The x-
axis points in the satellite’s track direction, with the positive 
values in front of nadir. The y-axis presents the lateral offset 
between the aircraft positions and the orbit. 
 
Fig. 8: Trajectory of the Flight within the Footprint  
Fig. 9 shows the trajectory of an aircraft inside the footprint 
departing from Lijiang Airport in South China. The footprint 
has been clipped to a length of +-600 km. The green dots are 
surface positions of taxi movements and the take-off run, the 
blue dots show the airborne track. Obviously satellite-based 
surveillance can principally provide satisfying results also for 
ground movements of aircraft. 
 
Fig. 9: Trajectory of an Aircraft departing from Lijiang Airport  
in the Antenna Footprint 
D. Antenna Footprint  
An essential aspect for the reception of ADS-B messages in 
space are the receiving conditions for the 1090 MHz extended 
squitter signal on board of a satellite. The signal path between a 
LEO satellite orbiting at altitude of 820 km and an aircraft at an 
altitude between 0 and 12 km is much longer than between an 
aircraft and an ADS-B ground station. The resulting 
propagation loss requires that the Mode S signals have to be 
detected nearly at noise level by a correlation process.  
The shape and extent of the footprint was determined by 
compiling histograms, which reflect the number of received 
messages with respect to the aircraft position in relation to the 
satellite position projected to an x-y plane. Fig. 10 shows a 
histogram for decoded position messages.  
 
Fig. 10: Histogram of received Position Messages in the Antenna Footprint  
The histogram shows two peaks, one lower in movement 
direction and the other higher behind the satellite, with a dip at 
the Nadir position. The footprint is not symmetrical, which is 
caused by a solar panel which protrudes over the front edge of 
the lower surface, the asymmetric mounting positions of the 
patch antennas and other equipment mounted at the underside 
of the satellite.  
The peaks of the histogram can be explained by the antenna 
radiation patterns of the receiving antennas of the satellite and 
the transmitting antenna of the aircraft. 
 
Fig. 11: Antenna Radiation Pattern of the PROBA-V ADS-B Antenna  
Fig. 11 shows the measured radiation pattern of the ADS-B 
patch antennas mounted on the underside of PROBA-V. The 
resulting combined antenna radiation pattern has an overall 
oval shape in the direction of the satellite movement and the 
maximum sensitivity slightly behind the Nadir direction.  
 
Fig. 12: Vertical Antenna Radiation Pattern of a  
top mounted L-Band Antenna [5]  
Fig. 12 shows the vertical antenna radiation pattern of an 
aircraft ATC top antenna, from which the satellite will receive 
the ADS-B signals.  
From the toroidal shape and the recess in the center results 
the so-called “cone of silence” vertically above an aircraft, so 
that an aircraft more or less directly below the satellite might 
not be detected at all or with a lower probability. The shape of 
the footprint strongly suggests that both “complementary” 
antenna patterns do not compensate each other, which results 
in the dip in the middle of the footprint.  
E. Performance Parameters  
The verification of space based 1090ES ADS-B surveil-
lance required the identification of performance parameters, in 
accordance to existing requirements for ground based ADS-B 
surveillance given in the respective documents by EUROCAE 
and EUROCONTROL [6] [7] [8].  
In the following some applicable performance parameters 
shall be shortly described. 
a) Probability of Target Acquisition: As was seen from 
the comparison of reference traffic and detected aircraft tracks 
certain targets are not detected at all when passed by the 
satellite’s antenna footprint. Thus a specific performance 
parameter for target detection has been defined:  
The Probability of Target Acquisition (PTA) shall be 
defined as the percentage ratio between the actual 
number of targets detected and the expected number of 
targets to be detected within a certain area or time of 
observation. Detection means the provision of 
positional data. 
b) Probability of Detection:  
The probability of detection (POD) shall be defined as 
the percentage ratio between the actual number of 
position messages received and the expected number 
of position messages. 
c) Probability of Target Identification:  
The Probability of Target Identification (PTI) is the 
percentage ratio between the actual number of aircraft 
identified and the expected number of aircraft which 
should have been identified. 
Aircraft normally will not change their identification (call 
sign) during flight, and thus a relatively sporadic identification 
will be sufficient, as by the ICAO address comprised in every 
ADS-B message each message can be allocated to a flight once 
identified. 
d) Probability of Identification:  
The probability of identification (POI) is the 
percentage ratio between the actual number of 
identification messages received and the expected 
number of identification messages. 
F. Evaluation of Performance Parameters  
For the evaluation of the performance parameters 
mentioned above, a zone filtering has been provided, which 
facilitates to filter the received ADS-B messages in accordance 
to defined areas on the earth map. This allows e.g. to mask out 
areas with high traffic density (“default”) as is North- and 
South-America, Europe and Asia and thus a high risk of 
garbling und therefor non-decodable messages. On the other 
hand the filtering allows for the performance evaluation for 
certain areas, like north Atlantic or Pacific transoceanic flight 
routes. The performance parameters shown in the Tables I to 
III have been computed from ADS-B messages received during 
March 2014.  
TABLE I: PROBABILITY OF TARGET ACQUISITION  







PTA [%] Aircraft 
identified 
PTI [%]
All 61798 64652 95,6 44665 69,1
Australia 2426 2559 94,8 1790 69,9
Default 23943 30719 77,9 16578 54
East Asia 12743 13859 91,9 9142 66
Europe 15106 17235 87,6 9538 55,3
North 
Atlantic 5039 6201 81,3 3480 56,1
Pacific 997 1301 76,6 734 56,4
TABLE II: PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 





All 1464447 10878627 13,5
Australia 95203 425298 22,4
Default 520709 3376666 15,4
East Asia 270910 2102401 12,9
Europe 244345 2290756 10,7
North Atlantic 92458 780939 11,8
Pacific 20508 156205 13,1
Table III: Probability of Identification 







All 149568 1087863 13,7
Australia 7240 42530 17,0
Default 50641 337667 15,0
East Asia 29439 210240 14,0
Europe 24863 229076 10,9
North Atlantic 8887 78094 11,4
Pacific 2131 15621 13,6
In general it must be said that the performance parameters 
of the experimental system at hand do not fulfill the 
requirements of an operational surveillance system. This can be 
explained mostly be the influence of the antenna diagrams of 
the ADS-B antenna on board of PROBA-V, pointing vertically 
down in the cone of silence of the aircraft ATC antenna or its 
vicinity.  
Better results could be expected by a slant pointing satellite 
ADS-B antenna, but which could not be mounted on PROBAV 
due to the restrictions for the hosted payload. For the future it 
is planned to operate PROBA-V at a slant attitude during 
periods, when it passes the dark side of the earth and the 
vegetation scanner thus is not in operation. With this 
configuration the antenna will point laterally to the aircraft 
antenna in the vicinity of the radiation pattern maximum.  
IV. SUMMARY  
The PROBA-V in-orbit demonstration has proven, that 
space based 1090ES ADS-B surveillance is technically 
feasible, and thereby the goals of the project “ADS-B over 
Satellite” have been attained.  
Though the experimental equipment used in the IOD does 
not provide the performance required for an operational 
system, essential results could be achieved and conclusions be 
drawn for the design of a future operational system. A space 
based ADS-B surveillance system providing worldwide 
coverage will consist of a fleet of satellites equipped with 
highly sophisticated multi-channel ADS-B receivers. Slantwise 
pointing spot beam antennas for all channels will overcome the 
cone of silence of aircraft transponder antennas, avoid a signal 
overload of the single receiver channels and provide an ample 
overall footprint for each satellite.  
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